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fallen going into the process that service leaders exited the quadren-
nial review convinced they had averted a disaster.
In reality, they had been forced to embrace a modernization plan
that guaranteed further erosion of U.S. air power in the years ahead.
Not only would the service not receive a sufficient number of air-
superiority fighters to sustain future combat rotations, but it would
prematurely exit airlift programs vital to other parts of the joint force
and lack a clear path forward for preserving critical surveillance capa-
bilities. The service had suffered bigger cuts in the 1990s, but given
further aging of the fleet in subsequent years, the damage imposed by
the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review was arguably worse.10
Management Mistakes Erode Space Power
The strategic planning guidance generated by senior policymakers
after the quadrennial review was completed directed the Air Force
to emphasize satellites and unmanned aerial vehicles over manned
aircraft in its development of future combat systems. It also directed
all of the services to stress user needs over platform types in
determining the best approach to meeting future reconnaissance
requirements guidance that was interpreted within the Air Force as
further pressure to abandon manned aircraft in acquiring next-
generation surveillance systems. Since OSD s issuance of strategic
planning guidance is an early step in the annual budget cycle
designed to shape service requests, the implication of such language
was that Rumsfeld and his advisers intended to use the budget
process to enforce the priorities established in the quadrennial review.
By the time the guidance was issued in early 2006, however, there
were numerous signs that proposed alternatives to manned aircraft in
reconnaissance and strike missions wouldn t be delivering big gains
in capability anytime soon. In the case of unmanned aerial vehicles,
their much-touted persistence in surveillance missions had not
enabled warfighters to find key al-Qaeda operatives such as Osama
bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, while plans to develop an
AGE AND INDIFFERENCE ERODE U.S. AIR POWER 59
unmanned vehicle for executing other types of combat missions were
still in flux. Most observers expected unmanned systems such as the
high-altitude, long-endurance Global Hawk aircraft eventually to
make a big contribution to success on the battlefield, but there wasn t
much evidence they could take the place of manned airframes in the
most demanding missions, such as conducting surveillance in con-
tested airspace.
Space systems were turning out to be an even bigger disappoint-
ment, due mainly to a series of management missteps during the
1990s that had left plans for next-generation reconnaissance and
communications constellations in disarray. When Secretary Rumsfeld
returned to the Pentagon in 2001 after a twenty-five-year absence, he
had just completed service as chairman of a presidential commission
reviewing national security space programs.11 That experience con-
vinced him that orbital systems were a vital but underutilized feature
of the nation s defense posture a feature that should figure promi-
nently in plans for military transformation. He therefore set about
reforming the way in which space systems were acquired and oper-
ated, with an eye toward using them more extensively in every facet
of military operations.
Among other things, Rumsfeld designated the Air Force as execu-
tive agent for the management of military satellites, launch systems,
and ground infrastructure (which included networks for processing
and disseminating the output of orbital sensors). This step took the
Air Force s traditional role in operating military space systems to a
new level, putting it in charge of almost every orbital constellation the
department was buying. Some outsiders complained that the fighter
pilots who dominated Air Force leadership had never given space
sufficient priority in their budgets or warfighting plans. But no other
service possessed the depth of experience or technical talent to serve
as executive agent for space, and Rumsfeld was loath to establish a
new defense agency for such a specialized purpose. So the Air Force
got the job.
Unfortunately, most of the key decisions concerning next-
generation spacecraft had been made in the 1990s, and as Rums-
feld s tenure progressed it became increasingly clear they had been
60 OF MEN AND MATERIEL
made badly. Every satellite program the Defense Department was
funding faced budget shortfalls, schedule slippage, and technical
problems. In an effort to reconcile reduced defense spending with
modernization requirements, the Clinton administration had made [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]

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