[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]clared that Ethiopian armed forces set the
goal of the liberation of Ethiopian territory
and do not intend to cross the frontiers of
their country.
Mengistu pointed out that an inauspicious
situation on the battlefields and the threat
of partition that [hangs over] the Ethiopian
state has wrought a negative influence on
the economic and domestic political situa-
tion of the country, undermine faith in the
victory of the Ethiopian revolution, [and]
encourage activities of internal reactionary
forces.
Revolutionary Ethiopia, in Mengistu’s
words, finds itself now in the enemy’s en-
circlement and aspires to support of first of
all the socialist states. By referring to the
need to improve Ethiopia’s defense under
these circumstances, Mengistu made a re-
quest to broaden Soviet military assistance.
Expanding on all this, Menquistu spoke
about his confidence in a final victory of
the revolution, stressing that the masses of
people firmly support the revolution and its
achievements that are being accomplished
in the interests of the people.
On our side we confirmed the principled
line of the Soviet Union to give all-sided
support to the Ethiopian revolution and to
continue the further expansion of Soviet-
Ethiopian relations. Mengistu also received
an agreement to supply during this year an
additional amount of Soviet armaments and
military equipment. He also received the
principled assurances of the Soviet side to
grant the PMAC assistance in working out
plans of social-economic development of
Ethiopia, including the dispatch to Addis
Ababa of certain specialists.
As a comradely advice, [the Soviet side]
shared with Mengistu ideas in favor of the
accelerated creation in Ethiopia of a party
based on the principles of Marxism-
Leninism, which would further the mobili-
zation of masses to defend revolutionary
conquests and to promote the revolution. It
was stressed to be important for the PMAC
to adopt practical measures to resolve the
nationalities question in Ethiopia in order
to ensure the support of the progressive re-
gime on the part of national minorities.
For the moment, we are left with the defi-
nite impression that in the existing situation
in Ethiopia and around it, the PMAC ur-
gently needs further assistance of our fra-
ternal countries through the mechanism of
bilateral relations, as well as on the interna-
tional arena.
[Source: SAPMO, J IV 2/202/583; obtained
and translated from Russian by Vladislav
M. Zubok.]
Conversation between East German
Socialist Unity Party (SED) official F.
Trappen and CPSU CC official K.
Brutents, 7 November 1977 (excerpt)
Memorandum of Conversation
between Comrade Friedel Trappen and
Comrade Karen Brutents, Deputy Head of
the International Relations Department of
the Central Committee of the CPSU,
7 November 1977
[Names of other participants]
Comrade Brutents thanked [Trappen]
for the interesting information. The Soviet
comrades completely agree with our policy.
The information they just received [from the
SED] contains several new aspects. There
has been only little information on the de-
velopments within the Eritrean Liberation
Movement, in particular concerning the
Marxist forces within this movement. It
would be of extraordinary importance if
these contacts would make possible contacts
between the Eritrean movement and the
Ethiopian leadership which could lead to an
armistice and pave the way for a peaceful
political solution.
So far the Ethiopian leadership has not
exhausted all possibilities for such a solu-
tion. It is necessary to support them in this,
and in this sense the contacts facilitated by
the SED are of great importance.
It now is important to utilize actively
these contacts for fruitful political work in
favor of a peaceful and political solution.
In the talks between the comrades of
the CPSU and the Ethiopian delegation it
was repeatedly emphasized that national
problems cannot be solved militarily.
[Source: SAPMO-BArch, DY30 IV 2/2.035/
126; obtained and translated by Christian
F. Ostermann.]
Memorandum of Conversation, East
German official with Soviet Ambassa-
dor to Ethiopia Ratanov, Addis Ababa,
6 December 1977 (dated 7 December)
Comrade Ratanov gave the following
information:
Militarily, the Eastern front is presently
the most difficult problem for the Ethiopian
side. Due to the correlation of forces the
initiative is with the Somali side. The Ethio-
pian troops are forced onto the defense. The
Ethiopian side is making all-out efforts to
mobilize around 60,000 to 70,000 men.
About 20,000 men will already be available
within the next few weeks. They will be
trained in short training courses. The Ethio-
pian side will be able to go on the offensive
in about 1 1/2 to 2 months.
The technical superiority of the Somali
troops is most prominent in heavy artillery.
Although the Ethiopian side has - due to
Soviet deliveries - at its disposal over 510
heavy guns while Somalia only has 126,
there is a lack of soldiers who can handle
the heavy artillery. The training is still tak-
ing time.
300 Cuban military experts (artillery,
tank drivers, pilots) are expected to arrive
soon.
The Ethiopian side currently has about
137 tanks on the Eastern front. The Somali
side has about 140.
40 Ethiopian tanks cannot be used in
battle due to minor repairs. Though these
repairs would normally be done by the tank
drivers themselves, they are not capable of
doing so. On the Somali side such repairs
are possible because the Soviet Union had
established the necessary repair station.
In recent days, the Ethiopian side has
for the first time launched air attacks on
mobile objects using the MiG 21. The nega-
tive opinion about the MiGs has meanwhile
improved (the [U.S.] F-5 is a much im-
proved model with a wider operational
range).
Comrade Ratanov gave the following
explanation of the Eritrean problem:
If it were possible to give the Ethio-
pian side a breathing-spell in Eritrea, it could
focus its efforts on the Eastern front. A dia-
logue has to be initiated. This has not been
done so far. In this regard, it would not be
advantageous to show all our cards right
away.
It is of critical importance that the
Ethiopian side is not willing to grant the
82 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN
Eritrean population autonomy within the
bounds of its old territories. They assume
that other peoples still reside in Eritrea (e.g.
Tigre and Afars). This has to be taken into
consideration. Therefore they want to trim
Eritrean territory. The area of the Afars
around the port of Assab as well as the Tigre
are to be separated. This would be almost
half of Eritrean territory.
Should the Ethiopian leadership stick
with this point of view, it will be difficult to
find a common ground for negotiations.
(Various peoples live, for example, in
Dagestan and Georgia. There are autono-
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