[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]

Chinese leaders and their respective repre-
North Korea (known officially as the Demo-
subsequently in scholarly literature. They
sentatives and associates in Korea regarding
cratic People’s Republic of Korea, or DPRK)
also reveal the depth of Stalin’s and Mao’s
the military-strategic significance of the
and their respective superiors in Moscow.
personal involvement and the complexity of
Inch’on landing.
Stalin considered the
In total, these new primary source materials
policymaking processes in Moscow and
Inch’on landing a development of vital stra-
amount to well over a thousand pages and
Beijing regarding the prosecution of the
tegic significance, fraught with grave impli-
come from the Archive of the President of
Korean War, as well as how domestic politi-
cations for the KPA [Document #3]. There-
the Russian Federation (APRF), the Archive
cal considerations and bureaucratic politics
fore, in his ciphered telegram dated 18 Sep-
of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation
in the USSR and PRC affected their respec-
tember 1950, he directed that Gen. Vasiliev,
(AVPRF) at the Ministry of Foreign Af-
tive policy outcomes concerning military
the Chief Soviet Military Adviser to the
fairs, and from the Military Archive at the
strategy and tactics. Finally, they reveal for
KPA, and Ambassador T.F. Shtykov, the
Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federa-
the first time a series of decisions by the
Soviet envoy to the DPRK, tell Kim Il Sung
tion.
Soviet leadership to reduce the Soviet pres-
to redeploy four KPA divisions from the
This article introduces and analyzes a
ence in Korea at that time, including three
Naktong River front to the vicinity of
selection of these newly declassified docu-
CPSU Politburo conferences (on 27 and 30
Seoul.10 Also on September 18, he ordered
ments from the Russian Archives related to
September 1950 and 5 October 1950) which
Soviet Defense Minister Marshal A.M.
the period after the U.S.-UN troops’ landing
considered the Chinese leadership’s pro-
Vasilevsky urgently to develop a plan for the
at Inch’on on 16 September 1950, until mid-
nounced reluctance to accommodate Stalin’s
Soviet Air Force to provide air cover to
October 1950, when the PRC decided to
prodding of Mao to send troops to rescue the
Pyongyang, including the transfer of several
send its troops to Korea to save Kim Il
DPRK, leading to Stalin’s 13 October 1950
Soviet Air Force fighter squadrons with
Sung’s collapsing regime. The newly re-
decision to abandon North Korea and evacu-
maintenance crews, radar posts, and air de-
leased documents primarily from the APRF,
ate Kim Il Sung and the remnants of the KPA
fense battalions from their bases in the Mari-
offer new information and insights into how
to Northeast China and the Soviet Far East,
time Province of the Soviet Far East (includ-
Stalin and his political representatives and
as well as his dramatic reversal less than
ing the strategic port city of Vladivostok) to
military advisers in Korea; Kim Il Sung and
twenty-four hours later upon learning of the
the airfields around Pyongyang [Document
his close associates; and Mao Zedong, Zhou
Chinese final decision to fight.
#1].
Enlai and their personal representatives in
The value of the ciphered telegrams lies
In contrast with Stalin’s judgment, nei-
Korea, viewed and assessed the strategic
in the fact that they reveal the atmosphere of
ther Shtykov nor Vasiliev seemed to grasp,
and military significance of the UN forces’
mutual finger-pointing which reigned in the
let alone forecast, the strategic importance
landing at Inch’on, recapture of Seoul, cross-
offices of the Soviet, North Korean, and
of the U.S. troops’s amphibious landing at
ing of the 38th parallel, and drive to the
Chinese decision-makers after the Inch’on
Inch’on—as Stalin harshly admonished them
Yalu. These new archival materials provide
landing. In the internal correspondence be-
in a withering message on September 27
researchers with a fascinating window into
tween Stalin and the Soviet political and
[Document #3]. They believed it was a bluff
the internal dynamics and politics of alli-
military advisers in Korea, Stalin blamed
aimed at distracting the attention of the KPA
ance relationships among the Soviet Union,
them for all the KPA failures in the Korean
Command from the main southeastern front.
PRC, and the DPRK from the aftermath of
campaign, whereas in his correspondence
Shtykov even suggested that an author of an
the Inch’on landing until the Chinese cross-
with Kim Il Sung Stalin blamed the KPA
article in the Soviet newspaper Pravda about
ing of the Yalu River. They present startling
commanders for military defeats, while in
the Inch’on landing should be brought to
96 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN
trial for disinformation and panicking. In
had not heard anything from them.13 Zhou
talions and regiments to the vicinity of
their correspondence with Stalin, they
complained that the DPRK leaders had per-
Inch’on and Seoul—were flawed and fraught
doubted the need to redeploy KPA troops
sistently ignored Mao Zedong’s advice and
with the possible annihilation of these units
from the Naktong River front to the defense
predictions and, moreover, deprived the
without providing any solution to the prob-
of Seoul, instead favoring a strategy of ex-
Chinese Ambassador in Pyongyang, Ni
lem as a whole. He stressed that only a
erting additional pressure on the southeast-
Zhiliang, of operational information about
pullout of main forces from the southeastern
ern front in order to throw the U.S. and ROK
the military situation, thereby preventing
front and creation of formidable lines of
troops defending the Pusan perimeter off the
him from informing his government prop-
defense east and north of Seoul could halt
cliffs into the Sea of Japan in a final great
erly in a timely fashion. As a result, Mao had
the unfolding UN offensive around Seoul.
offensive. Consequently, they dragged their
only sketchy reports about the execution and
Upon receiving Stalin’s message from
feet in executing Stalin’s order to withdraw
consequences of the Inch’on landing.
Roshchin on September 21, Zhou expressed
four KPA divisions from the Southeast to
In response to Roshchin’s question about
satisfaction that the Soviet assessment of the [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]

zanotowane.pl

doc.pisz.pl

pdf.pisz.pl

kajaszek.htw.pl